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A COSTLY VICTORY: JUNE MEDICAL,
FEDERAL ABORTION LEGISLATION, AND
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Thomas J. Molony*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s recent major abortion
ruling in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo1 was a win for
abortion rights supporters, but a costly one. Although the June
Medical Court struck down a Louisiana law requiring abortion
doctors to have admitting privileges at a local hospital,2 a majority
of the Justices—and most importantly, Chief Justice Roberts,
whose concurrence constitutes the Court’s holding—stressed that
Casey’s constitutional standard for pre-viability abortion
regulations is not the amorphous balancing test the Court
suggested in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, but a more
deferential one under which a pre-viability regulation typically
will be sustained if it does not place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability.3
Pro-choice advocates seem to have realized immediately
what June Medical portends because, amidst their cheering the
*

Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law.
1. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020).
2. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020) (“We . . .
hold that the Louisiana statute is unconstitutional.”).
3. See id. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Nothing about Casey suggested that a
weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job for the courts. . . . Casey
instead focuses on the existence of a substantial obstacle . . . .”); id. at 2154 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“Casey . . . rules out the balancing test adopted in [Hellerstedt].”); id. at 2165
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“The District Court should apply Casey’s ‘substantial obstacle’ test,
not the [Hellerstedt] balancing test.”); id. at 2179 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legal
standard the plurality applies when it comes to admitting privileges for abortion clinics turns
out to be exactly the sort of all-things-considered balancing of benefits and burdens this
Court has long rejected.”); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[F]ive Members of the
Court reject the [Hellerstedt] cost-benefit standard. . . . I agree with [that] conclusion[].”).
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result, they renewed calls for federal legislation4 to protect the
constitutional right to choose that the Court recognized in 1973.5
Two days after inauguration, the Biden administration declared
that it is of the same mind, so a bill to “codify[] Roe v. Wade” may
not be far away.6
Proposing measures to protect a woman’s ability to have an
abortion, however, is not something new. Members of Congress
have introduced and reintroduced bills of this type many times
over the years. In 2007, for example, the day after the Court
upheld the federal partial birth abortion ban in Gonzales v.
Carhart,7 then Senator Barbara Boxer introduced the Freedom of
Choice Act (FOCA),8 legislation that supposedly would enshrine
Roe v. Wade in federal law. Barack Obama promised to sign
FOCA as his first act as President.9 That didn’t happen, and
beginning in 2014, members of the House and Senate began
proposing the more modest Women’s Health Protection Act
(WHPA), a version of which Representative Judy Chu and
4. See Colin Seeberger, The Supreme Court Rejects Attempt to Undermine Abortion
Rights in June Medical Services v. Russo, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/GP7J-D3HG (“Reliance on the courts . . . is not enough; state and federal
legislation is also necessary to prevent attacks on abortion care and proactively improve
access.”); Supreme Court Rules in favor of Abortion Providers in June Medical Services v.
Russo, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/KW45-VZWD (“It’s time
for Congress to pass . . . a federal bill that would ensure the promise of Roe v. Wade is
realized in every state for every person.”); NARAL President Ilyse Hogue Comments on
Supreme Court Decision in June Medical Services v. Russo, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM.
(June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/C8C9-K9AU (“This case underscores the need for federal
protections for abortion rights.”); ACLU Statement on Supreme Court Ruling in June Medical
Services v. Russo, ACLU (June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/NR9B-PGLN (“This is a critical
victory for Louisianans, but . . . the right to get an abortion is far from secure. . . . That’s why
Congress must . . . help ensure that a person who needs abortion care is able to get it . . . .”);
Herminia Palacio, How Congress Can Immediately Seize on Monday’s Abortion Rights Win,
REWIRE NEWS GRP. (June 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/EAP7-DXC8 (“[W]e need federal
action to restore and protect access to abortion across the whole country . . . .”).
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (declaring that a woman has a
constitutional right to have an abortion).
6. Statement from President Biden and Vice President Harris on the 48th anniversary
of Roe v. Wade, White House (Jan. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/5M4G-FWZ7.
7. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (concluding that the federal
partial-birth abortion ban is constitutional).
8. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. (2007). Senator Boxer first
introduced a similar bill in 2004. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 2020, 108th Cong. (2004).
9. See Irin Carmon, Pro-choice politicians try playing offense (again), MSNBC (Nov.
13, 2013), https://perma.cc/7Q5J-E3A7 (“The first thing I’d do as president is sign the
Freedom of Choice Act.”) (quoting then-presidential candidate Barack Obama).
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Senator Richard Blumenthal most recently sponsored in 2019.10
The irony of the abortion rights victory in June Medical, though,
is that it weakens Congress’s power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws like FOCA and WHPA.
Both FOCA and WHPA cite Section 5 as a source of
congressional authority.11 Which makes sense as a general
proposition, for when the Court decided to preserve Roe’s
“essential holding” in its 1992 Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision,12 it declared that a
woman’s right to have an abortion emanates from the guarantee
of liberty secured under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.13 Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce
the rights the Clause protects.14
But Congress’s power under Section 5 is not unlimited. As
the Court explained in City of Boerne v. Flores when it decided
that Congress did not have the power under Section 5 to impose
on state and local governments the limitations under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act,15 Congress may use Section 5 to adopt
remedial or deterrent legislation, but it may not use it to effect a
substantive change to the Due Process Clause.16 And to be
10. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong.; Women’s
Health Protection Act of 2019, H.R. 2795, 116th Cong. Senator Blumenthal first introduced
a similar bill in 2013. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2013, S. 1696, 113th Cong.
11. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(14) (2007) (proposing
congressional power for legislation); Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645,
116th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (proposing congressional power for legislation). The two bills also
suggest that the Commerce Clause supplies Congress with the necessary power. See
Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(14) (2007); Women’s Health Protection
Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(3); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing
that “Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
12. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992).
13. See id. (“The controlling word . . . is ‘liberty.’”). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
15. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (concluding that Congress
could not require State and local governments to comply with the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993).
16. See id. at 519 (“The design of the Amendment and the text of §5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”).
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preventative rather than substantive, “many of the laws affected
by the congressional enactment [must] have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional.”17
That’s why June Medical is so significant to Section 5
power. Because of June Medical, the probability that an abortion
regulation contravenes a woman’s due process rights has declined
sharply. Congress’s Section 5 power is more constrained than
previously thought.
This Article explores Congress’s ability to use its power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact FOCA
and WHPA. Part I describes what FOCA and WHPA attempt to
accomplish. Part II briefly discusses the relationship between the
Federal Government and the States before turning to the contours
of Congress’s Section 5 power, with particular attention to City of
Boerne and important decisions that followed it. Next, Part III
analyzes the extent to which Section 5 might sustain FOCA and
WHPA. In so doing, this Article explains how June Medical
simultaneously opened the door to state regulation of abortion and
weakened congressional power under Section 5 to protect
abortion rights. Part IV then considers the implications for
Section 5 power if the Court goes beyond June Medical and
overrules Roe. Finally, this Article concludes that, if Congress
wishes to adopt FOCA or WHPA, it will need to find its power
somewhere other than Section 5.
II. THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ACT AND THE
WOMEN’S HEALTH PROTECTION ACT
As the Court in Casey reaffirmed Roe’s “essential
holding,”18 it opened the door to increased State and Federal
regulation of abortion.19 And when the Gonzales Court
determined that the opening was wide enough to allow the federal

17. Id. at 532.
18. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992).
19. See, e.g., id. at 873 (“[A] necessary reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and
the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our view, that we abandon the
trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the
protection of fetal life.”).
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partial-birth abortion ban, FOCA’s sponsors saw a threat to Roe
and concluded that they needed to act.20
FOCA is sweeping legislation.
It attempts to bar
government at every level—federal, state, and local—from
“deny[ing] or interfer[ing] with” a woman’s right to choose to
have an abortion either before fetal viability or when necessary to
protect her life or health after viability.21 Moreover, FOCA would
prohibit measures that discriminate against a woman’s “exercise
of the[se] rights . . . in the regulation or provision of benefits,
facilities, services, or information.”22 Importantly, FOCA would
not permit a government to escape its restrictions under any
circumstances—even when a regulation is supported by a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.23
WHPA is more modest. Although the proposed legislation
applies to all levels of government24 and similarly would
invalidate any ban on abortion prior to viability or a ban after
viability that does not include an exception to allow the procedure
when “continuation of the pregnancy would pose a risk to the
pregnant patient’s life or health,”25 WHPA gives governments a
bit more latitude with respect to regulations that might “interfere”
with a woman’s ability to choose. And rather than seeking a
20. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(9) (2007) (“[T]hreatening Roe,
the Supreme Court recently upheld the first-ever Federal ban on [an] abortion [procedure]
. . . .”).
21. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(1) (2007). Departing from
Roe’s definition, FOCA defines “viability” as “that stage of pregnancy when . . . there is a
reasonable likelihood of the sustained survival of the fetus outside of the woman.” Freedom
of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 3(3) (2007); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160
(1973) (indicating that viability is the “point at which the fetus becomes . . . potentially able
to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.”).
22. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(2) (2007).
23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (indicating that, following Roe, “regulation[s] touching
upon the abortion decision . . . [could] be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further
a compelling state interest.”).
24. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(e)
(addressing the Act’s relationship to Federal law); Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019,
S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 5 (addressing the Act’s relationship to State and local law).
25. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(9). Like
FOCA, departing from Roe, WHPA defines “viability” as “the point in a pregnancy at which
. . . there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained fetal survival outside the uterus with or
without artificial support.” Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong.
§ 3(5).
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return to Roe, WHPA takes aim at so-called TRAP—Targeted
Regulation of Abortion Providers—measures that purport to
regulate abortion for the purpose of fostering maternal health, but
that pro-choice advocates insist are intended to limit access.26
WHPA would bar a host of specific TRAP laws, including
those that require certain tests and procedures, that limit the
ability to use certain drugs or telemedicine, that require hospital
privileges, or that impose credentialing or facility standards.27
WHPA also would prohibit some waiting periods, as well as laws
that place limitations on abortion based on a woman’s reasons for
having one.28 More broadly, though, WHPA would free abortion
providers from laws similar to those specified and from other
measures that “both—(A) single[] out the provision of abortion
services, health care providers who provide abortion services, or
facilities in which abortion services are provided; and (B)
impede[] access to abortion services based on [specified
factors].”29
Unlike FOCA, however, WHPA does not impose an
absolute bar on all regulations of the types specified. Instead,
WHPA allows a challenged regulation to stand if the government
successfully “establish[es], by clear and convincing evidence,
that—(1) the limitation or requirement significantly advances the
safety of abortion services or the health of patients; and (2) the
safety of abortion services or the health of patients cannot be
advanced by a less restrictive alternative measure or action.”30

26. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Jan. 2020), https://perma.cc/24LD-246L (defining TRAP laws as “regulations[] targeted
specifically at abortion clinics that go beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety,”
and contending that the “primary purpose [of these laws] is to limit access to abortion.”); see
also Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (describing the
law’s purposes).
27. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. §§ 4(a)(1), (46).
28. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. §§ 4(a)(7), (11)
(barring “medically unnecessary in-person visits” and regulations that require a woman to
state her reasons for having an abortion or prohibit a physician from performing an abortion
based on a woman’s reasons).
29. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(2).
30. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(d).
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III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Limitations on Congressional Power
Driving both FOCA and WHPA is the threat that state
legislation poses to the availability of abortion access throughout
the country.31 The Constitution, however, does not give Congress
dominion over the States.32 Under the federal system the
Constitution preserves, the States are separate, “indissoluble”
sovereigns,33 and only when Congress acts within the confines of
the powers delegated to it under the Constitution can Congress
encroach on the States’ ability to govern what happens within
their borders.34
When Congress acts pursuant to its delegated powers, the
federal legislation reigns supreme and overrides inconsistent state
laws,35 but the Constitution “contains no whatever-it-takes-tosolve-a-national-problem power.” 36 Thus, regardless of what
Congress may perceive about the importance of nationwide
access to abortion, its authority to adopt FOCA and WHPA must
find its roots in a power specified in the Constitution.
31. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (“An
independent review . . . found that . . . the biggest threats to the quality of abortion services
in the United States are State regulations that create barriers to care.”); Freedom of Choice
Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong § 2(10) (2007) (“Incremental restrictions on the right to choose . . .
have made access to abortion care extremely difficult, if not impossible, for many women
across the country.”).
32. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018)
(“[C]onspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue
direct orders to the governments of the States.”).
33. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1868).
34. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (“The Federal Government . . . must show that a constitutional grant of
power authorizes each of its actions. . . . The Constitution may restrict state governments . . .
. But where such prohibitions do not apply, . . . [t]he States . . . can and do perform many of
the vital functions of modern government.”); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (“[I]f
there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond
peradventure that federal power over commerce is ‘superior to that of the States to provide
for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’ however legitimate or dire those
necessities may be.”).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
36. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 659-60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution represents the original
delegation of congressional power.37 Various amendments
adopted over the years, however, have expanded Congress’s
power such that it may adopt legislation to enforce the
amendments’ substantive features.38 One such amendment is the
Fourteenth,39 and with a woman’s right to choose ostensibly
found in Section 1’s Due Process Clause,40 both FOCA and
WHPA identify Congress’s enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment as one of the sources of power for the
legislation.41 Critical to understanding the scope of this power are
the Court’s 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores and the
rulings that followed it.
B. City of Boerne and Its Progeny
In City of Boerne, the Court evaluated whether Section 5
gave Congress the authority to impose on state and local
governments the restrictions set forth in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).42 Enacted in 1993 on the heels of the
Court’s landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
RFRA provides that a government may not “substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion” unless the government can
establish that it has a compelling interest for doing so and uses the

37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing Congress’s powers).
38. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (granting Congress enforcement power);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (same); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (same).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“Congress [has] power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the [amendment’s] provisions.”).
40. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy
derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .”).
41. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(14) (2007) (proposing
congressional power for legislation); Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645,
116th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (same).
42. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (indicating that the case
required the Court to determine whether Congress had the power to enact the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).

2021

A COSTLY VICTORY

41

“least restrictive means” of advancing its interest.43 To apply
RFRA against the States, Congress looked to Section 5.44
The positive grant of authority under Section 5, the City of
Boerne Court explained, allows Congress to enact remedial and
deterrent legislation even when the legislation encroaches on
traditional state legislative power and bars conduct that the
Constitution permits.45 But the Court stressed that Congress
cannot use Section 5 to expand the meaning of Section 1’s Due
Process Clause: “There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect.”46 Moreover,
according to the Court, although Congress has substantial
freedom to determine what legislation is necessary to enforce
Section 1,47 Section 5 does not permit Congress to usurp the role
of the judiciary.48
According to the Court, Congress went too far with RFRA.49
In Smith, the Court held that neutral laws of general applicability
do not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.50 Though laws directed at religion had to satisfy a
demanding constitutional test,51 the City of Boerne Court pointed
43. Id. at 515-16.
44. See id. at 516-17 (indicating that Congress relied on Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment as the source of authority for imposing RFRA’s requirements on state and local
governments).
45. See id. at 517-18 (describing the scope of congressional power under Section 5).
46. Id. at 520.
47. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“It is for Congress in the first instance to
‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.”).
48. See id. at 524 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against
the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. . . . The power
to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”).
49. See id. at 536 (“RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation
of powers and the federal balance.”).
50. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise
of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object . . . but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended.”); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (describing the Smith
Court’s holding).
51. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (stating that if “the law is not neutral, . . . it is invalid unless it is justified by a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”); see also City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (citing City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533).
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out that RFRA’s legislative record did not reflect a recent history
of religious bigotry or laws intentionally discriminating against
religious exercise.52 More importantly, the Court remarked that
RFRA’s breadth belied a remedial aim:
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that . . . . [i]t appears . . . to attempt a
substantive change in constitutional protections.
Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may
be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of
the laws affected . . . have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional.53

The Court noted that RFRA was broad, reaching every level
of government and all laws—Federal, State, and local.54
Although the Court indicated that the absence of a termination
date or geographic limits (like those found in remedial voting
rights legislation) was not dispositive, RFRA failed to include
such provisions, which would have tailored its scope.55
Moreover, the Court emphasized that RFRA’s compelling
interest/least restrictive means test placed disproportionate
burdens on the States, significantly “intru[ding] into the States’
traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens.”56
Following City of Boerne, the Court principally has applied
the decision’s lessons in cases in which states have claimed
sovereign immunity from private lawsuits for violations of federal
laws barring discriminatory conduct. In those cases, the Court
explained that Congress effectively abrogates sovereign
immunity when its legislation clearly reflects a congressional
intent to do so, and Congress has the power to regulate the
relevant conduct under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.57
52. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (indicating that the legislative record was
devoid of “examples of legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the
burdened religious practices or that . . . indicate some widespread pattern of religious
discrimination in this country.”)
53. Id. at 532.
54. See id. (describing RFRA’s breadth).
55. See id. at 533 (indicating the absence of limitations of the types present in remedial
voting rights legislation).
56. Id. at 534.
57. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004) (explaining the conditions under
which Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity); Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538
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The Court uniformly determined that Congress sufficiently had
indicated its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity in the statutes
at issue,58 but applying City of Boerne, the Court reached differing
conclusions as to Congress’s Section 5 power.59
The first notable case after City of Boerne, though, did not
involve an anti-discrimination measure. In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, the Court considered whether Congress had the power
under Section 5 to enact the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), a law that
subjected states to liability for patent infringement.60 The Court
concluded that Congress did not have that power.61
The Florida Prepaid Court recognized that, through the
Patent Remedy Act, Congress sought to address the harm patent
holders suffer when they are not compensated for state patent
infringement,62 but similar to what the City of Boerne Court had
noted in relation to RFRA, the Court in Florida Prepaid observed
that the congressional record supporting the patent legislation did
not identify a “pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”63 Moreover, the
U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (same); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363
(2001) (same); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (same); see also Allen
v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000-01 (2020) (stating what is required to abrogate sovereign
immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
635 (1999) (same). The Court consistently has recognized that Congress cannot abrogate
sovereign immunity through its Article I powers. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1001 (indicating
that Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity when it draws its power from Article I);
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727 (same); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (same); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80
(same); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636 (same).
58. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1001 (indicating that Congress effectively indicated its
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity); Lane, 541 U.S. at 518 (same); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at
726 (same); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64 (same); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (same); Fla. Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 635 (same).
59. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (finding that the statute could not be sustained under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 374 (same); Kimel, 528
U.S. at 80-83 (same); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647 (same). But see Lane, 541 U.S. at 531
(finding that the statute was sustainable under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728, 735 (same).
60. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631-32 (describing federal patent law).
61. See id. at 630 (indicating that Congress could not use is Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power to enact the patent law).
62. See id. at 639-40 (specifying the “‘evil’ or ‘wrong’ that Congress intended to
remedy”).
63. Id. at 640.
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Court explained, the Fourteenth Amendment only protects
against the deprivation of property without due process, and
Congress had not given much attention to whether state remedies
were inadequate.64 Furthermore, the Court added that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects against intentional conduct and
that most of the evidence suggested that state patent infringement
was unintentional.65 The Court stressed that Congress had not
attempted to tailor the Patent Remedy Act to non-negligent
infringement for which a state-court remedy is unavailable or to
limit the Act’s application to particular states with a pattern of
infringement or without adequate remedies.66 According to the
Court, “it simply cannot be said that ‘many of [the acts of
infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.’”67
A year after Florida Prepaid,68 the Court in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents decided that Congress did not have the power
under Section 5 to enact the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) with application to state and local governments.69
In so doing, the Court emphasized that age is not a suspect or
quasi-suspect class for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, and therefore, state legislation that
discriminates based on age need only satisfy the deferential
rational basis standard of review, under which a law passes
constitutional muster so long as it bears a rational relationship to
a legitimate government interest.70

64. See id. at 643-44 (discussing state law remedies).
65. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (noting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment).
66. See id. at 646-47 (observing the absence of limitations).
67. Id. at 647.
68. Later in the same year, the Court addressed Section 5 in United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000). According to the Morrison Court, Section 5 could not sustain Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) because it was directed at private action rather than state
action and imposed penalties on private officials rather than state officials. See id. at 625
(stating that VAWA “is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias”). Because FOCA and WHPA are
directed at state action, Morrison generally is inapposite to Congress’s Section 5 authority
to adopt those bills. Therefore, detailed attention to Morrison in this Article is not warranted.
69. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (describing the Court’s
conclusion).
70. See id. at 83-84 (describing the standard for assessing the constitutionality of
legislation that discriminates based on age).
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For the Kimel Court, the relevant standard of review was
critical to its determination that ADEA did not satisfy City of
Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test: “[t]he Act . . .
prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and
practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”71 The Court
stressed that ADEA makes age-based discrimination “prima facie
unlawful” and that its “bona fide occupational qualification[s]”
defense could not save the law because the defense required proof
that the classification was a “reasonable necessity.”72 According
to the Court, the standard for the defense was more like the
“heightened scrutiny” that would apply to a suspect or quasisuspect classification.73
The Kimel Court added, however, that the wide net that
ADEA casts was not enough to preclude Section 5 power.74 The
Court also had to consider the harm that Congress intended to
remediate or prevent: “[d]ifficult and intractable problems often
require powerful remedies . . . .”75 As in City of Boerne and
Florida Prepaid, though, the Court in Kimel found lacking a
record of unconstitutional state age discrimination.76 The Court
discounted a California age discrimination study because it did
not suggest that the State’s discriminatory conduct was
unconstitutional,77 and the Court indicated that, even if the study
had identified unconstitutional age discrimination, the study
would not justify applying ADEA to every state.78 According to
the Court, “Congress’[s] failure to uncover any significant pattern
of unconstitutional discrimination . . . confirms that Congress had

71. Id. at 86.
72. Id. at 86-87 (discussing the bona fide occupational qualifications defense).
73. See id. at 87-88 (indicating that the standard under the ADEA was far higher than
the constitutional standard).
74. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (“That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to
be held unconstitutional . . . does not alone provide the answer to our §5 inquiry.”).
75. Id. at 88-89 (noting that remedial efforts must be measured against the harm to be
addressed).
76. Id. at 89 (indicating the deficiencies in the congressional findings).
77. Id. at 90 (“[T]he California study does not indicate that the State had engaged in
any unconstitutional age discrimination.”) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. (discussing the geographic scope of ADEA).
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no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was
necessary in this field.”79
In 2001, the Court turned from ADEA to the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), deciding in Board of Trustees of
University of Alabama v. Garrett that Congress did not have the
power under Section 5 to force state governments to comply with
Title I’s employment discrimination provisions.80 As with age in
Kimel, the Court in Garrett observed that disability is not a
protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore,
measures that discriminate based on disability are subject only to
a rational basis standard.81 And again, consistent with Kimel, the
Court concluded that Congress had not identified a sufficient
pattern of unconstitutional conduct,82 and even if it had, the scope
of Title I’s prohibition against employment discrimination was so
broad that it effected a substantive alteration of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s meaning.83
According to the Court, the legislative record included fewer
than ten instances of state employment discrimination, and the
discrimination in those cases was not necessarily irrational and
therefore unconstitutional.84 The Court added that the standard
that an employer must satisfy for relief from its obligation to
make an employment accommodation—establishing “that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship”85—was much
more rigorous than the Constitution’s rationality requirement.86
79. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
80. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (concluding
that Congress did not have the power under Section 5 to extend the Title I antidiscrimination
provisions to the States).
81. See id. at 366-67 (specifying the standard of review applicable to disability-based
discrimination).
82. Id. at 368 (“The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment
against the disabled.”).
83. See id. at 372 (“Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by the ADA
against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality
as were found in City of Boerne.”).
84. Id. at 368-69 (discussing the absence of evidence of unconstitutional discrimination
in the legislative record). The Court considered evidence of local government or societal
discrimination immaterial. Id. (discussing the legislative record).
85. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added) (reciting the ADA’s exception).
86. Id. at 372 (“[E]ven with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what
is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that
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With heightened scrutiny applicable to gender
discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs
reached a different conclusion regarding Congress’s Section 5
power to extend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)
to the States.87 Referring to Garrett and Kimel, the Hibbs Court
pointed out that, because discrimination based on age and
disability is subject to the rational basis standard of review,
evidence of widespread discriminatory conduct was necessary to
confer Section 5 power.88 According to the Court in Hibbs, the
higher standard of review for gender discrimination eased
Congress’s burden of “show[ing] a pattern of state constitutional
violations.”89
The evidence in the congressional record, the Hibbs Court
determined, was sufficient.90 The Court noted in particular that
both public and private employers had failed to treat men and
women comparably with respect to leave for childcare, and the
Court emphasized that “differential leave policies were not
attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women,
but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for
family members is women’s work.”91 Moreover, the Court
credited evidence of disparate treatment of men by state
employers, even when the policies for women and men were
comparable.92
Having identified ample congressional findings, the Hibbs
Court then determined that FMLA represented a proportionate
response.93 By extending family leave benefits to all employees,
the Court pointed out, Congress had tried to reduce an employer’s
would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ upon the
employer.”).
87. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (noting the FMLA’s
aim and the applicable Fourteenth Amendment standard of review); id. at 740 (concluding
that application of the FMLA to the States is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5
authority).
88. Id. at 735 (discussing Garrett and Kimel).
89. Id. at 736.
90. Id. at 734.
91. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731
92. See id at 732 (discussing discriminatory application of facially comparable
policies).
93. Id. at 740.
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temptation to hire men rather than women and attempted to drive
out stereotypes about the roles men and women play in caring for
their families.94 In addition, the Court distinguished City of
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, stating that “FMLA is narrowly
targeted at the faultline between work and family—precisely
where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment
relationship.”95 Moreover, the Court highlighted structural
aspects of FMLA that further limit its scope. For example, the
Court noted that the statute allows for unpaid leave, only applies
to employees with a certain tenure, and requires advance notice
when a leave is anticipated.96
Though the Garrett Court had decided that Congress did not
have the power under Section 5 to apply Title I of the ADA to the
States, 97 consistent with Hibbs, the Court in Tennessee v. Lane
concluded that—to the extent that Title II seeks to assure “basic
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to
more searching judicial review”—Congress could use its Section
5 power to make the States subject to Title II’s prohibition against
discrimination in benefits from services, programs, and
activities.98 Among these basic guarantees, the Court explained,
are “access to the courts,” which serves the rights to procedural
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, to free speech
under the First Amendment, and to certain protections in criminal
proceedings under the Sixth Amendment.99
The Court in Lane stated that “Congress enacted Title II
against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the
administration of state services and programs, including
systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.”100 As proof, the
Court cited state laws discriminating against the disabled in
voting, marriage, and jury service and previous rulings in which
the Court determined that state agencies unconstitutionally
94. Id. at 737 (discussing the FMLA’s aims).
95. Id. at 738.
96. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 739 (listing limitations to the FMLA’s scope).
97. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
98. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004).
99. Id. at 523 (describing constitutional rights the protection of which requires access
to courts).
100. Id. at 524.
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discriminated against the disabled with respect to zoning,
institutional commitment, and the provision of mental health
care.101 The Court added that lower courts similarly had
concluded that the disabled had been subject to unlawful
discrimination in connection with “public services, programs, and
activities.”102 Looking even more narrowly, the Lane Court
credited evidence before Congress suggesting that disabled
individuals were being prevented from accessing the courts and
participating in a meaningful way in court proceedings.103
Evaluating Title II’s proportionality to the harms identified,
the Court acknowledged that Title II applies to a wide range of
activities and services but limited its evaluation to court access
and did not opine as to other activities, such as access to public
hockey rinks.104 And with respect to court access, the Lane Court
decided that Title II was sufficiently limited, requiring only
“reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers
to accessibility.”105 Thus, according to the Court, “Title II, as it
applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of
access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’[s]
§5 authority.”106
The Court’s foray again into Section 5 power, in Allen v.
Cooper, was a 2020 reprise of Florida Prepaid, but in the
copyright context. And the result was the same.107 The Cooper
Court concluded that Congress could not use Section 5 to enact
the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA), a
statute that sought to make states liable for copyright
infringement.108

101. See id. at 524-25 (citing evidence of unconstitutional discrimination).
102. Id. at 525.
103. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 (describing the evidence Congress considered when it
enacted the ADA).
104. See id. at 530-31 (specifying the scope of the Court’s decision).
105. Id. at 531.
106. Id. at 533-34.
107. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 998-99 (2020) (“[T]his Court held in Florida
Prepaid . . . that the patent statute lacked a valid constitutional basis. Today, we take up the
copyright statute. We find that our decision in Florida Prepaid compels the same
conclusion.”).
108. See id. at 999 (explaining what CRCA does).
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“Florida Prepaid all but prewrote [its] decision,” the Cooper
Court declared.109 Referring to Florida Prepaid, the Court in
Cooper explained that the Due Process Clause only precludes the
intentional or perhaps reckless taking of a copyright when no
adequate state remedy is available.110 Observing that a report
before Congress identified “only a dozen possible examples of
state [copyright] infringement”111 and noting that just two of the
twelve examples involved conduct that might violate the Due
Process Clause, the Cooper Court did not see evidence of
constitutional harm sufficient to differentiate CRCA from the
Patent Remedy Act for Section 5 purposes.112 Thus, consistent
with Florida Prepaid, the Court in Cooper concluded that CRCA
failed City of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality”
requirement: “[T]he scope of the two statutes is identical—
extending to every infringement case against a State. . . . In this
case, as in Florida Prepaid, the law’s ‘indiscriminate scope’ is
‘out of proportion’ to any due process problem. . . . and
[therefore] . . . is invalid under Section 5.”113
IV. JUNE MEDICAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
FOCA AND WHPA
As the Court’s decisions from City of Boerne to Cooper
testify, evidence of unconstitutional activity and the related
constitutional test are critical to determining the scope of
Congress’s Section 5 power. Thus, evaluating FOCA and WHPA
in relation to Section 5 requires one to understand the
constitutional standard that governs to abortion regulations. That
standard is the undue burden test the Casey Court adopted, and
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical controls
what the test requires.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1007.
See id. at 1004-05 (discussing the Due Process Clause’s requirements).
Id. at 1006.
See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1006-07 (evaluating the congressional record).
Id. at 1007.
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A. June Medical L.L.C. v. Russo
To grasp the contours of Casey’s undue burden test and what
June Medical means for the test, one best starts with the familiar
trimester framework that the Court established in Roe and
replaced in Casey. Roe’s trimester framework specified a series
of tests that would apply over the course of a woman’s
pregnancy.114 During the first trimester, according to the Roe
Court, a woman had the right, based on her physician’s medical
judgment, to terminate her pregnancy “free of interference by the
State.”115 After the end of the first trimester, Roe explained, the
right became subject to a State’s ability to regulate abortion in
service of the State’s interest in maternal health.116 And finally,
the Court decided, once a fetus becomes viable—the point at
which the fetus can live outside the womb with or without
medical assistance117—a State may bar a woman from choosing
abortion except when “it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of [her] life or health.”118
As the Casey Court reaffirmed a woman’s abortion rights in
1992, however,119 it discarded the trimester framework, stating
that the framework “misconceive[d] the nature of the pregnant
woman’s interest[] and . . . undervalue[d] the State’s interest in
potential life.”120 To protect a woman’s right to make “the
ultimate decision” prior to viability while preserving an
appropriate level of regulatory latitude throughout pregnancy, the
Casey Court substituted a new undue burden standard for Roe’s
trimester system.121 The Court explained that, “[a]n undue
burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its
purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”122
114. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
115. See id. at 163.
116. See id. at 164 (discussing the nature of a woman’s right after the first trimester).
117. See id. at 160 (reciting the meaning of the term “viability”).
118. Id. at 165.
119. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (affirming that “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability
and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”).
120. Id. at 873.
121. See id. at 875-76.
122. Id. at 878.
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In a critical departure from Roe, the Court stressed that a State
may adopt pre-viability regulations aimed at preserving maternal
health and potential life, even if the regulations have the
“incidental” effect of increasing the cost of abortion or making
access to the procedure more difficult.123 With respect to postviability regulations, though, the Court charted no new waters,
leaving states with the higher degree of autonomy that Roe
permitted in the third trimester.124
Importantly, the Casey Court declared that decisions
following Roe were wrong to employ strict scrutiny because that
standard undervalued the State’s interests in safeguarding
maternal health and protecting potential life.125 Yet the Court’s
uneven application and description of the undue burden standard
over time have made it difficult to pin down the standard’s limits.
Both in Casey itself and then in Gonzales, the Court signaled that
the undue burden standard has a rational basis component or at
least one that is similarly deferential.126 The Court in Hellerstedt
later suggested otherwise, however, asserting that the undue
burden standard requires courts to balance a regulation’s benefits
against its burdens.127 Justice Thomas accused the Hellerstedt
Court of reframing the undue burden standard as one that

123. See id. at 874 (“The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed
to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.”).
124. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to
viability, the State . . . may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother.’”).
125. See id. at 871 (indicating that courts were wrong to apply strict scrutiny when
evaluating abortion regulations).
126. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (“Where it has a rational basis
to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar
certain procedures and substitute others . . . in furtherance of its legitimate interest[] in . . .
promot[ing] respect for life, including life of the unborn.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (“[T]he
Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be
performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that
those same tasks could be performed by others.”).
127. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (“Casey . . .
requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer. . . . [It] is wrong to equate the judicial review . . . with the less
strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”).
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resembles strict scrutiny.128 June Medical, though, now brings
some measure of clarity, rejecting Hellerstedt’s balancing test as
inconsistent with Casey.129
In June Medical, a fractured 5-4 majority struck down a
Louisiana statute that required a physician performing an abortion
to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.130 In so doing,
four Justices concluded that the law was invalid under
Hellerstedt’s balancing test.131 Chief Justice Roberts, the fifth
Justice in the majority, however, concurred only in the Court’s
judgment and only based on stare decisis. The Chief Justice
noted that he had joined the dissent in Hellerstedt and continued
to think that the Hellerstedt majority had gone off course,132 but
he emphasized that the Louisiana law was “nearly identical to the
Texas [admitting privileges statute]” which the Hellerstedt Court
declared unconstitutional.133
Under Marks v. United States, as the June Medical
judgment’s narrowest basis—the near identity of the Louisiana
and Texas laws, the near identity of the factual records in
Hellerstedt and June Medical, and stare decisis—the Chief
Justice’s concurring opinion represents the holding of the
Court.134 Thus, one must look to the Chief Justice’s explanation
of the Constitution’s demands with respect to abortion regulation
to determine whether a particular regulation stands or must fall.
128. See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court “transform[ed]
the undue-burden test to something . . . akin to strict scrutiny”).
129. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J, concurring) (“Nothing about Casey suggested that a weighing of costs and benefits of
an abortion regulation was a job for the courts.”).
130. See id. at 2133 (“Act 620’s admitting-privileges requirement places a substantial
obstacle in the path of a large fraction of those women seeking an abortion for whom it is a
relevant restriction. . . . [and] is unconstitutional.”).
131. See id. at 2120 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2324)
(“[C]ourts must ‘consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer.’”).
132. See id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (stating that he “joined the dissent in
[Hellerstedt] and continue[s] to believe that the case was wrongly decided”).
133. See id. (“Today’s case is a challenge from several abortion clinics and providers
to a Louisiana law nearly identical to the Texas law struck down four years ago in
[Hellerstedt].”).
134. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. . . .’”).
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In his June Medical concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts
employed stare decisis in two ways. First, he determined that
stare decisis required him to reject Hellerstedt’s balancing test to
“remain[] true to an ‘intrinsically sounder’ doctrine established in
[Casey that] better serves the values of stare decisis than would
following the recent departure” from that doctrine in
Hellerstedt.135 Second, he concluded that, notwithstanding the
Hellerstedt Court’s mischaracterization of Casey’s undue burden
test, stare decisis demanded adherence to the Court’s judgment in
Hellerstedt to the extent that, but only to the extent that, the
judgment rests on the conclusion that the Texas admitting
privileges statute placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before viability, a conclusion the
Chief Justice continued to believe was wrong, but that would have
been sufficient to invalidate the statute under Casey’s test
properly understood.136 Reconciling Hellerstedt with the proper
understanding of Casey’s undue burden standard was necessary
to the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the Louisiana statute at issue
in June Medical was unconstitutional, and his articulation of what
Casey demands now controls future applications of Casey’s
test.137
135. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995)) (alterations adopted) (internal
quotations omitted).
136. See id. at 2138-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“We should respect the statement
in [Hellerstedt] that it was applying the undue burden standard of Casey. . . . In this case,
Casey’s requirement of finding a substantial obstacle before invalidating an abortion
regulation is therefore a sufficient basis for the decision, as it was in [Hellerstedt].”).
137. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (“When an
opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion
necessary to that result by which we are bound.”). The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits both have recognized that Chief Justice Robert’s June Medical
concurrence controls what Casey’s undue burden standard requires. See EMW Women’s
Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 433 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Because all laws
invalid under the Chief Justice’s rationale are invalid under the plurality’s, but not all laws
invalid under the plurality’s rationale are invalid under the Chief Justice’s, the Chief Justice’s
position is the narrowest under Marks. His concurrence therefore “constitutes [June
Medical’s] holding . . . .”); Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.2020) (“Chief
Justice Robert’s [sic] vote was necessary in holding unconstitutional Louisiana’s admittingprivileges law, so his separate opinion is controlling.”). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit and the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Indiana
and the District of Maryland, however, have disagreed, insisting that Hellerstedt’s balancing
test continues to apply because June Medical’s plurality opinion and the Chief Justice’s
concurrence do not share a sufficient “common denominator.” See Whole Woman’s Health
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v. Paxton, 972 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2020) (“In June Medical, the only common
denominator between the plurality and the concurrence is their shared conclusion that the
challenged Louisiana law constituted an undue burden.”); Whole Woman’s Health Alliance
v. Hill, No. 1:18-cv-01904-SEB-MJD, 2020 WL 5994460, at *28 (Oct. 9, 2020) (“[W]e
conclude that June Medical did not hand down a new controlling rule for applying the undue
burden test in abortion cases. We thus shall apply the constitutional standards set forth in
the Supreme Court’s earlier abortion-related jurisprudence, in particular, Casey and
Hellerstedt.”); Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F.Supp.3d 183, 209
(D. Md. 2020) (“Where [Hellerstedt] remains the most recent majority opinion delineating
the full parameters of the undue burden test, the Court finds that its balancing test remains
binding on this Court.”). But those courts the Fifth Circuit and district courts drift off course
by ignoring the “common denominator” that both the plurality and the Chief Justice
considered Hellerstedt binding precedent. For each, though, it was a matter of degree. While
the plurality considered Hellerstedt binding in full, the Chief Justice treated it more
narrowly—as precedent only to the extent of its conclusion that the Texas admitting
privileges requirement creates a substantial obstacle. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390, 1416 n.6 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“On very rare occasions, . . . it can be
difficult to discern which opinion’s reasoning has precedential effect under Marks. But even
when that happens, the result of the decision still constitutes a binding precedent . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted). And if the Court did not view the Chief Justice’s concurrence
as a retreat from Hellerstedt, one wonders why the Court granted petitions for certioriari,
vacated the underlying judgments, and remanded for further consideration in light of June
Medical two Seventh Circuit decisions that address abortion regulations other than an
admitting privileges requirement. See Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky,
Inc., 937 F.3d. 973, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming an injunction against amendment of
an Indiana parental consent requirement), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 141 S. Ct.
187, 187-88 (2020); Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, 896 F.3d. 809, 812
(7th Cir. 2018) (affirming an injunction against an Indiana statute extending waiting period
following ultrasound), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 141 S. Ct. 184, 184 (2020).
See also Amy Howe, Justice grant new cases, send Indiana abortion cases back for a new
look, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/5TKB-3EVZ (suggesting that Court
remanded the ultrasound case for consideration in light of “the more lenient test outlined” in
the Chief Justice’s concurrence); Michael C. Dorf, SCOTUS Abortion GVR’s Suggest June
Medical Narrowed The Right, DORF ON LAW (July 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/82V3-SSNU
(describing the decision to remand as pro forma, but describing Hellerstedt’s balancing test
as “now-defunct”). Finally, although not dispositive, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent from the
Court’s 2021 decision to grant a stay with respect to the Maryland District Court’s injunction
against a restriction on medication abortions makes absolutely no mention of “balancing” or
“benefits” in reference to Casey’s undue burden standard. See FDA v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 579-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).Given that
Chief Justice Roberts’s substantive analysis of stare decisis begins with his conclusion that
the Texas and Louisiana laws were “nearly identical,” June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2141-42
(Roberts, C.J, concurring), and his professed continuing disagreement with Hellerstedt,
which disagreement included disputing that the petitioners’ evidence was sufficient for the
district court to conclude that the Texas admitting privileges requirement represented a
substantial obstacle, see Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2343-50 (discussing evidentiary
deficiencies), the Chief Justice’s June Medical concurrence properly is interpreted as
limiting Hellerstedt to its facts. Hellerstedt should have no application outside a challenge
to an admitting privileges regulation, and whether another admitting privileges requirement
might withstand constitutional challenge depends on the underlying record. If the Chief
Justice considered Hellerstedt applicable to other types of abortion regulations, then the
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June Medical138 is a marked departure from Hellerstedt’s
uncertain balancing test and a declaration that the undue burden
standard offers much more latitude for state regulation. The
Court in June Medical explains:
[T]he threshold requirement [is] that the State have a
“legitimate purpose” and that the law be “reasonably related
to that goal.” So long as that showing is made, the only
question for a court is whether a law has the “effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”139

Casey and Gonzales confirm that the showing that an
abortion regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose
is akin to deferential rational basis review. 140 Casey does so
indirectly when it cites Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc. in connection with its conclusion that requiring a physician
to provide information to a woman satisfies constitutional
demands.141 Deferring to the legislature’s decision to bar
opticians from engaging in certain activities, the Williamson
Court had declared that “[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”142 Gonzales
is explicit on this point: “Where it has a rational basis to act, and
it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its
regulatory power . . . in furtherance of its legitimate interests in
comparability of the Louisiana and Texas statutes would have been irrelevant. The factual
record in those cases regarding the effect on access alone would have been sufficient to
conclude that the Louisiana statute imposed a substantial obstacle and was unconstitutional.
138. Because the Chief Justice’s concurrence in June Medical is controlling under
Marks, when this Article refers below to June Medical or the June Medical Court, it is
referring to the Chief Justice’s opinion.
139. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2138 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 882, 877).
140. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit equates the “showing”
with the rational basis standard. See Friedlander, 978 F.3d at 433 (explaining that the
requirement that an abortion regulation “be ‘reasonably related’ to a legitimate state interest
. . . is met whenever a state has ‘a rational basis to . . . use its regulatory power . . . .’”). One
scholar, however, describes Casey’s ‘reasonably related’ test “as falling somewhere between
rational-basis review and intermediate scrutiny—or in other words, as a form of rationalbasis with ‘teeth’ or ‘bite.’” Stephen G. Gilles, Restoring Casey’s Undue-Burden Standard
After Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701, 753 (2017).
141. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
885 (1992) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
142. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.
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regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for
life.”143 And, citing Gonzales, the June Medical Court similarly
affirmed that the “traditional rule” of permitting legislative
discretion in cases of medical uncertainty.144
Moreover, specific applications of the undue burden
standard in Casey, Mazurek v. Armstrong, and Gonzales indicate
how little is required in the initial “showing” to which June
Medical refers. Pointing out that “the Constitution gives the
States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be
performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective
assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be
performed by others,” the Casey Court upheld the requirement
that a physician provide information to a woman seeking an
abortion as a “reasonable means” to achieve the legitimate
purpose of “ensur[ing] that the woman’s consent is informed,”145
Similarly, when the Court in Mazurek determined that a law
banning medical professionals who are not physicians from
performing abortions did not violate the Constitution,146 the Court
stressed that Casey “foreclosed” any argument that the “law must
have had an invalid purpose because ‘all health evidence
contradicts the claim that there is any health basis’ for the law.”147
Moreover, the Gonzales Court upheld the federal partial birth
abortion ban in the absence of “reliable data to measure the
[extent to which] . . . some women come to regret their choice to
abort”148 and over Justice Ginsburg’s charge that “[t]he law saves
not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of
performing abortion.”149
Gonzales instructs that those challenging an abortion
regulation bear the burden of showing150 that the regulation has
143. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).
144. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
145. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885. See also id. at 882 (indicating that seeking to ensure that
woman is adequately informed is a legitimate purpose).
146. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 (1997) (concluding that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that the law violated the undue burden standard).
147. Id. at 973.
148. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
149. Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
150. See id. at 156 (indicating that those challenging the federal partial birth abortion
ban has not met their burden of proof that the ban would impose an undue burden). See also
June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (“[T]he plaintiff’s burden
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the “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”151 With respect to the
very few measures the Court has struck down under Casey’s test,
the Court described what it considered a massive effect on access.
In Casey, the Court concluded that Pennsylvania’s spousal
notification requirement likely would cause a “significant number
of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children
. . . to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the
Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”152 The
Court in Stenberg v. Carhart decided that Nebraska’s partial-birth
abortion ban would prohibit the most common second trimester
abortion procedure.153 The Hellerstedt Court determined that
Texas’s admitting privileges requirement eliminated about half of
the abortion facilities in the State and that the State’s ambulatory
surgery center requirement would reduce the number by another
thirty percent.154 And the Court in June Medical credited the
District Court’s findings that Louisiana’s admitting privilege
requirement would “result in a drastic reduction in the number
and geographic distribution of abortion providers,” thereby
burdening access “to the same degree [as] or worse [than]” the
Texas statute, reducing the number of clinics in Louisiana from
three to one or two and the number of physicians performing
abortions from five to one or two.155
When it established the undue burden standard, the Casey
Court explained: “What is at stake is the woman’s right to make
in a challenge to an abortion regulation is to show that the regulation’s ‘purpose or effect’ is
to ‘plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.’”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2343 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“Under our cases, petitioners must show that the admitting privileges and ASC
requirements impose an ‘undue burden’ on women seeking abortions.”).
151. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 877).
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (emphasis added).
153. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (emphasis in original) (“Nebraska
does not deny that the statute imposes an ‘undue burden’ if it applies to the more commonly
used D&E procedure . . . . And we agree with the Eighth Circuit that it does so apply.”).
154. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2312, 2316 (discussing the effect of Texas’s
admitting privileges requirement and the stipulated effect of the ambulatory surgery center
requirement).
155. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2140 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(indicating the possible changes in the number of clinics and doctors); see also June Medical,
140 S. Ct. at 2128-32 (Breyer, J., plurality).
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the ultimate decision . . . . [A] State may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy
before viability.”156 The burden on those challenging an abortion
regulation is to show that the regulation violates this fundamental
principal.
B. Section 5 Power to Enact FOCA and WHPA After June
Medical
It is in reference to June Medical’s explanation of Casey’s
undue burden standard that one must assess the extent to which
Congress has the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact FOCA and the WHPA. Garrett offers a
structured way to do this. The first step, the Garrett Court
explained, “is to identify with some precision the scope of the
constitutional right at issue.”157 The second is to determine
whether Congress has “identified a history and pattern of
unconstitutional” conduct relevant to the legislation under
consideration.158 And the final step (though the Garrett Court did
not label it as such) is to evaluate whether the measure is
“congruen[t] and proportional[]” to the identified harm.159

156. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 879.
157. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). See also
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004) (“The first step of the Boerne inquiry requires
us to identify the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce . . . .”); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999)
(“Following City of Boerne, we must first identify the Fourteenth Amendment ‘evil’ or
‘wrong’ that Congress intended to remedy . . . .”).
158. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. See also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020)
(“[C]ourts are to consider the constitutional problem Congress faced—both the nature and
the extent of state conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment. That assessment usually
(though not inevitably) focuses on the legislative record . . . .”); Lane, 541 U.S. at 523
(“Whether Title II validly enforces these constitutional rights is a question that ‘must be
judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.’”); Fla. Prepaid, 527
U.S. at 639-40 (“[A]ny §5 legislation ‘must be judged with reference to the historical
experience . . . it reflects.’”).
159. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. See also Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (“[C]ourts are to
examine the scope of the response Congress chose . . . . Here, a critical question is how far,
and for what reasons, Congress has gone beyond redressing actual constitutional
violations.”); Lane, 541 U.S. at 530 (“The only question that remains is whether Title II is
an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.”); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (indicating that whether Congress has the power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a measure depends on whether there is
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1. Scope of the Constitutional Right
Defining “with some precision” the right that FOCA and the
WHRA seeks to protect—a woman’s right to choose abortion—
requires an understanding of the limitations that Roe and Casey
identify.160 Importantly, the Roe Court commented that the right
to choose is not “absolute” and is inherently different from other
rights protected by the constitutional right to privacy.161 Because
of the pre-natal life involved,162 the Roe Court explained, “at
some point . . . . [t]he woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any
right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.”163
Casey likewise stresses that “[a]bortion is a unique act”164
and that a woman’s freedom “is not . . . unlimited.”165 The
Constitution, the Casey Court declared, protects “the right of the
woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to
obtain it without undue interference from the State.”166 “What is
at stake,” according to the Court, “is the woman’s right to make
the ultimate decision.”167
After viability, though, the right to choose is more limited.
As Roe declares and Casey affirms, “subsequent to viability, the
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.”168
With the Roe and Casey Courts’ admonitions and Casey’s
undue burden test as the governing standard, then, the scope of
the abortion right has two parts. First, a woman has the right to
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be
achieved”).
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right to choose is not absolute and not
unqualified).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 159 (“She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical
definitions of the developing young in the human uterus.”).
163. Id.
164. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992).
165. Id. at 869.
166. Id. at 846.
167. Id. at 877.
168. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S.
at 164-65).
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“mak[e] the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.”169 Second, a woman has the right to have an abortion
after viability when “necessary” to “preserv[e] [her] life or
health.”170
2. Evidence of Unconstitutional Conduct
Having defined the abortion right’s scope, one turns to
evidence of unconstitutional conduct. The Court in Kimel
explained that, for Section 5 to confer power on Congress,
Congress must identify a “significant pattern of unconstitutional
[behavior sufficient to give] Congress . . . reason to believe that
broad prophylactic legislation [i]s necessary.”171 The Hibbs
Court stressed, however, that “it [i]s easier for Congress to show
a pattern of state constitutional violations” when a demanding
standard of review applies.172
The Court’s evaluation of the congressional record in City of
Boerne and the cases that followed it is demonstrative of the
importance of the standard of review to Congress’s evidentiary
burden. For the Court in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel,
Garrett, and Cooper, the absence of evidence in the congressional
record of widespread unconstitutional behavior was
significant,173 and in all of those cases, the constitutional test for
the applicable state measures and conduct was very lenient. For
example, a State contravenes the due process rights of a patent or
copyright holder only if the State intentionally (or perhaps
169. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
170. Id.
171. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
172. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
173. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1006 (2020) (indicating that no “part of the
legislative record shows concern with whether the States’ copyright infringements (however
few and far between) violated the Due Process Clause.”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (“The legislative record of the ADA . . . simply fails to
show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in
employment against the disabled.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 64-65 (“Congress never identified
any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever
that rose to the level of constitutional violation.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (“Congress identified no pattern of patent
infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (“[T]he emphasis of the hearings was on laws of general
applicability which place incidental burdens on religion.”).
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recklessly) infringes on the patent or copyright.174 Similarly, to
avoid contravening the right to free exercise of religion, a
regulation need only be neutral and generally applicable.175 And
state action that discriminates based on age or, in the employment
context, disability need only have a rational basis.176
In Hibbs, on the other hand, the Court noted that the
intermediate standard of review applicable to sex discrimination
eased Congress’s burden of establishing “a pattern of state
constitutional violations.”177 Accordingly, the Hibbs Court
credited evidence in the congressional record not only of states’
gender-based discriminatory leave policies and practices, but also
more generally state laws discriminating against women in the
workplace and private sector discrimination with respect to leave
benefits.178 Referring to what Hibbs stated regarding the test for
gender-based discrimination, the Lane Court noted that the
constitutional rights associated with access to courts enjoyed at
least as much, and in some cases more, scrutiny than genderbased discrimination.179 And, the Court in Lane indicated, the
evidence of “widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities
from the enjoyment of public services” is more plentiful than the
evidence of gender discrimination in Hibbs.180 Specifically, the
Lane Court noted discriminatory conduct with respect to the
disabled, not only with respect to access to the courts, but also in
a wide array of other contexts involving public services.181
174. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (“[A]n infringement must be intentional, or at least
reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause.”); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at
645 (“[A] state actor’s negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person’s property does
not ‘deprive’ that person of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.”).
175. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (“[Employment Division v.] Smith held that
neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not
supported by a compelling governmental interest.”).
176. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“States are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions
toward such individuals are rational.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (“States may discriminate on
the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in
question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
177. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
178. See id. at 730 (discussing Hibbs’s consideration of evidence associated with
gender-based discrimination).
179. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (discussing Hibbs).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 523-29 (detailing the history of discrimination against the disabled in
public services).
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Casey’s undue burden test is not quite as lenient as the
standards of review that City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett
describe, nor is the test a heightened standard like the ones
involved in Hibbs and Lane. Indeed, Hellerstedt’s uncertain
balancing test is gone, and the June Medical Court emphasized
the substantial regulatory latitude that states enjoy under the
undue burden standard.182 Casey, Mazurek, and Gonzales testify
that the initial “showing” (presumably by the State) which June
Medical specifies—that the regulation at issue is reasonably
related to a legitimate purpose—is very deferential.183 Moreover,
unlike when a traditional heightened standard of review applies,
the undue burden test does not require the State to show a tight
means-ends connection. Instead, it is a party challenging an
abortion regulation who bears the burden of establishing that the
regulation places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before viability.184
Though Casey’s undue burden test undoubtedly calls for
review that is less deferential than the rational basis standard,
given the minimal showing required of the government in the first
part of the test and the heavy burden on a regulation’s challenger
in the second part, Congress must satisfy greater evidentiary
demands than those in Hibbs and Lane if it wishes to use Section
5 to free women from state abortion regulations.185 So long as the
Court continues to adhere to Casey and Roe, however, existing
evidence of unconstitutional behavior should be sufficient to
confer on Congress at least some Section 5 authority in relation
to abortion.
Casey is quite clear: “[A] State may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy
182. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (Roberts, C.J,
concurring) (“[W]e have explained that the ‘traditional rule’ that ‘state and federal
legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and
scientific uncertainty’ is ‘consistent with Casey.’”).
183. See id. at 2138, 2157 (discussing Casey, Mazurek, and Gonzales). See also supra
notes 145-49 and accompanying text (explaining how Casey, Mazurek, and Gonzales reveal
a deferential standard).
184. See id. at 2133 (indicating that one challenging an abortion regulation has the
burden of showing that a substantial obstacle exists).
185. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878
(1992).
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before viability[,]”186 and the Casey Court did nothing to disturb
the Court’s suggestion in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth that determining when viability occurs is a
case-by-case medical decision not subject to legislative
determination.187 Yet, state legislation banning abortion entirely
or during the early stages of a woman’s pregnancy has a long
history that continues to this day.
The Roe Court indicated that the Texas abortion ban at issue
in the case had existed in substantially the same form since
1857188 and that “a large majority of jurisdictions” had adopted
very restrictive abortion bans by the 1950s.189 Moreover, when
the Court decided Roe, thirty-one states broadly banned abortion
throughout pregnancy.190
A similar number of states have pre-viability bans in place
today. As of November 2020, twenty-eight states had laws in
place that prohibit abortion at or before twenty-four weeks, most
with exceptions for the life or physical health of the woman and
a few with other exceptions.191 Twenty-four of those twentyeight states ban abortion at twenty-two or fewer weeks, with
fourteen states banning the procedure at twenty or fewer weeks.192

186. Id. at 879.
187. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976)
(“[I]t is not the proper function of the legislature . . . to place viability . . . at a specific point
in the gestation period. The time . . . may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination
. . . is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.”).
188. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 119 (1973) (recounting the history of the Texas
abortion ban).
189. Id. at 139.
190. Id. at 118 n.2 (citing Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming abortion laws).
191. See State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov.
1, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZF22-67HU (describing state abortion bans). Ten of those states
have more than one week-specific ban. See id. (same). The number of weeks is measured
from the beginning of a woman’s last menstrual period.
192. See id. (describing state abortion bans). Alabama has both a twenty-two week
ban and an outright ban; Louisiana has a twenty-two week ban, a fifteen week ban and an
outright ban; Utah has both an eighteen week ban and an outright ban; Arkansas has a twentytwo week ban, an eighteen week ban and a twelve week ban; Mississippi has a twenty week
ban, a fifteen week ban, and a six week ban; and Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, North Dakota,
and Ohio each have both a twenty-two week ban and a six week ban. See id. (describing the
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And three of those fourteen states had laws that prohibit abortion
entirely, one including exceptions for when the life or physical
health of the woman is at stake and the other two containing a life
exception only.193 Finally, sixteen of the twenty-eight states with
week-specific bans had enacted pre-viability bans that apply
depending on a woman’s reason for choosing abortion—whether
based on the sex or race of the fetus or the existence of a “genetic
anomaly” with respect to the fetus.194
The Casey Court recognized that, in 1992, viability
sometimes occurred around twenty-three to twenty-four weeks
gestation and viability may be achieved earlier in the future
depending on technological advances.195 Based on a 2015 New
England Journal of Medicine article, viability now may be
achieved as early as twenty-two weeks gestation.196 Because the
number of weeks in the week-specific bans described above is
measured from the beginning of a woman’s last menstrual period
and gestational age is measured from the date of fertilization
(approximately two weeks later),197 a twenty-four week ban bars
abortion beginning at what may be the earliest date of viability
right now. Thus, even a twenty-four week ban likely prohibits at
least some pre-viability abortions and thereby would run afoul of
Casey’s categorical proscription of pre-viability bans.

Alabama, Louisiana, Utah, Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, North Dakota,
and Ohio abortion bans).
193. See id. (describing the abortion bans in Louisiana, Alabama, and Utah).
194. See Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/8935-T7RD (describing state abortion
bans based on the reason a woman seeks to terminate her pregnancy).
195. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
860 (1992) (discussing the timing of viability).
196. See Matthew A. Rysavy et al., Between-Hospital Variation in Treatment and
Outcomes in Extremely Preterm Infants, 372 N.E. J. MED. 1801, 1804 (2015) (“Overall rates
of survival, survival without severe impairment, and survival without moderate or severe
impairment were 5.1% (interquartile range, 0 to 10.6), 3.4% (interquartile range, 0 to 6.9),
and 2.0% (interquartile range, 0 to 0.7), respectively, among children born at 22 weeks of
gestation.”).
197. As the Guttmacher Institute explains, “20 weeks postfertilization is equivalent to
22 weeks [from the beginning of the last menstrual period].” State Bans on Abortion
Throughout Pregnancy, supra note 190 (describing state abortion bans). See also Leo Han
et al., Blurred Lines: Disentangling the Concept of Fetal Viability from Abortion Law, 28
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 287, 288 (2018) (“[S]tates have chosen to limit abortion at 20
weeks after fertilization (22 weeks after the last menstrual period) . . . .”).
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Consequently, it is not at all surprising that lower courts have
enjoined all but one ban at twenty weeks or earlier,198 and
although the vast majority of twenty-two week, twenty-four
week, and pre-viability purpose-based bans are in effect,199 their
constitutionality is extremely suspect.200 Considering abortion
bans alone, the evidence of unconstitutional behavior in relation
to Roe certainly exceeds what the Court found in City of Boerne,
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett, and Cooper.
Abortion bans, however, constitute only a small fraction of
post-Roe state abortion regulatory activity. As of February 2020,
each of twenty-six states had enacted twenty or more abortion
regulations since Roe, and the total number enacted by those
states collectively exceeded 1,000.201 Louisiana, Indiana,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas alone accounted for over 250.202
Among the state measures adopted are TRAP laws, informed
consent provisions, ultrasound requirements, parental or spousal
consent or notification measures, prohibitions on the use of
telemedicine, laws barring non-physicians from performing
abortions, waiting periods, and reporting requirements.203 Many
198. See State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, supra note 190 (indicating
which state abortion bans are in effect).
199. See id. (indicating which state abortion bans are in effect); Abortion Bans in Cases
of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, supra note 193 (same).
200. But see Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion Bans, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1109-29 (2014) (proposing a possible basis for concluding that
a narrow sex selection is constitutional).
201. See Elizabeth Nash, Louisiana Has Passed 89 Abortion Restrictions Since Roe:
It’s About Control, Not Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3TLD-MD2D (tabulating abortion regulations on a State by State basis).
202. See id. (describing Louisiana’s regulatory activity).
203. See Elizabeth Nash & Megan K. Donovan, Ensuring Access to Abortion at the
State Level: Selected Examples and Lessons, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/E66K-ATJ5 (describing various state abortion regulations); Targeted
Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/GE7X-T4JV (identifying various types of TRAP regulations); Counseling
and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/RRV7-CCKY (describing informed consent and waiting period
requirements); Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/XB4K-ZZYS (describing state laws requiring ultrasounds); An Overview of
Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/C7VW-GFEL
(describing various types of abortion regulations); Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/EGX6-ZX87 (specifying states that bar telemedicine
for medication abortions); Abortion Reporting Requirements, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1,
2020), https://perma.cc/AHA4-J8XC (describing reporting requirements).
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states also have imposed restrictions on medication abortions and
have adopted bans on particular abortion methods, some
prohibiting dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortions and a
majority making “partial birth” abortion illegal.204
That states are active in abortion regulation, however, is not
the measure of Congress’s power to enact prophylactic or
remedial measures under Section 5.
It is widespread
unconstitutional behavior that matters, and outside of previability abortion bans and a handful of other lesser limitations,
invalidation of abortion regulations has been very rare.
To be sure, the Court invalidated some abortion regulations
in Casey, Stenberg, Hellerstedt, and June Medical, but in each of
those cases, the Court determined that the regulations would have
a severe impact on a woman’s right to make the ultimate
decision.205 Abortion regulations that do not affect access in a
similar way have received the Court’s approbation. As the Casey
Court explained, “[a]ll abortion regulations interfere to some
degree with a woman’s ability to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy.”206
But that does not mean they all are
207
unconstitutional.
The crucial question is whether a regulation
actually deprives a woman being able to terminate her
pregnancy.208
Even before Casey, the Court upheld regulations that had
applied to first trimester abortions. In Danforth, for instance, the
Court rejected a challenge to a Missouri statute that required a
woman to provide written consent before having a first trimester
abortion—even though almost no other Missouri law applicable

204. See Medication Abortion, supra note 202 (detailing restrictions on medication
abortions); Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/W3QQ-9VZ2 (describing state bans
on abortion methods).
205. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing Casey, Stenberg,
Hellerstedt, and June Medical).
206. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875
(1992).
207. See id at 874 (“The fact that a law . . . has the incidental effect of making it more
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.”).
208. See id. at 875 (“[T]he Court’s experience applying the trimester framework has
led to the striking down of some abortion regulations which in no real sense deprived women
of the ultimate decision. Those decisions went too far . . . .”).

68

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:1

to similar medical care contained a comparable requirement.209
Moreover, the Danforth Court determined that reporting and
recordkeeping requirements that applied regardless of the stage of
pregnancy did not run afoul of the Constitution.210 Later, in
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.
v. Ashcroft, the Court found constitutional a Missouri law
mandating that tissue from a surgical abortion performed in a
licensed clinic be sent for examination by a pathologist, even
though a pathologist’s examination would make an abortion more
expensive.211 And although the Court in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. invalidated an ordinance
that forced the “attending physician” to provide certain
information to a woman seeking an abortion (rather than allowing
another qualified person to provide the information), the Court
acknowledged that a State may limit to doctors the authority to
perform abortions.212
Of course, the Casey Court opened the door to even more
state regulation, sustaining a host of statutory provisions,
including ones like those the Court had struck down under Roe’s
trimester framework: a specific medical emergency definition
woven throughout Pennsylvania’s regulatory web, a requirement
that a physician (rather than another qualified person) provide
information in connection with a woman’s informed consent, an
obligation to disclose to a woman information specified by the
State, a twenty-four hour waiting period, a parental consent
requirement, and reporting and recordkeeping duties.213 After
209. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976)
(“[T]he imposition . . . of . . . a [written] requirement . . . even during the first stage . . . is not
in itself an unconstitutional requirement. . . . [W]e see no constitutional defect in requiring
it only for some types of surgery . . . or . . . for abortions.”).
210. See id. at 79-81 (evaluating Missouri reporting and recordkeeping requirements).
211. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983) (“We think
the cost of a tissue examination does not significantly burden a pregnant woman’s abortion
decision. The estimated cost of compliance . . . was $19.40 per abortion performed, and in
light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist’s examination can have, this small cost
clearly is justified.”) (internal citations omitted).
212. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447
(1983) (“[W]e have left no doubt that, to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the
States may mandate that only physicians perform abortions.”).
213. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-887, 899-901 (1992) (evaluating and upholding various
provision of the abortion law at issue); see also Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759-65 (1986) (striking down an informed
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Casey and consistent with Akron, the Court in Mazurek upheld a
district court’s denial of an injunction against a law that restricted
the performance of abortions to physicians (and did not allow
physician’s assistants to perform them), based on the conclusion
that there was insufficient evidence that the restriction would give
rise to a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to choose
abortion.214 And finally, after Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales
upheld against constitutional challenge a federal partial birth
abortion ban that was narrower than the Nebraska ban at issue in
Stenberg, even though the federal law applied throughout
pregnancy and contained no exception that would allow the
procedure when necessary to protect the health of the woman.215
Moreover, other than many pre-viability bans, the vast
majority of existing abortion regulations have not been
invalidated by lower courts.216 For example, although most
admitting privileges requirements have been enjoined, the lion’s
share of TRAP laws remain in place across the country.217 In
addition, nearly all informed consent, waiting period, ultrasound,
and reporting requirements and all but two restrictions on
medication abortions are in effect.218 Finally, even though
consent measure requiring that a woman be given information specified by the State); City
of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444, 449-51 (striking down an informed consent measure requiring
that a woman be given information specified by the State, a 24-hour waiting period, and a
regulation requiring a physician to provide certain information).
214. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971, 976 (1997) (discussing the district
court’s conclusion and reversing the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit that denial of the injunction was improper).
215. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 154 (2007) (“In Stenberg the Court found
the statute covered D&E. Here, by contrast, interpreting the Act so that it does not prohibit
standard D&E is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its terms.”) (internal
citations omitted); id. at 168 (“Respondents have not demonstrated that the Act, as a facial
matter, is void for vagueness, or that it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to
abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception.”).
216. See generally An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 202 (detailing the status
of various abortion regulations); Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note
202 (detailing the status of mandatory counseling and waiting period requirements);
Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 202 (detailing the status of state laws mandating
conveyance of information related to performance of an ultrasound).
217. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 202 (indicating the
status of various types of TRAP regulations).
218. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 202 (detailing the
status of mandatory counseling and waiting period requirements); Requirements for
Ultrasound, supra note 202 (detailing the status of state laws mandating conveyance of
information related to performance of an ultrasound); Abortion Reporting Requirements,
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Stenberg and lower courts have determined that almost all bans
that would cover D&E abortions are unconstitutional, at least
fourteen state partial birth abortion bans were in force as of
November 1, 2020.219
Still, the invalidation of abortion bans and at least some other
types of abortion regulations make FOCA and WHPA different
from the legislation at issue in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid,
Kimel, and Garrett, in which the Court found a dearth of even
arguably unconstitutional activity.220 For FOCA and WHPA,
then, so long as the Court continues to recognize a constitutional
right to choose,221 the question of Section 5 power comes down
to “congruence and proportionality.”222
3. Congruence and Proportionality
Emphasizing the necessity of “congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end,” 223 the City of Boerne Court
stated that Congress may not rely on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment “to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections.”224 Both FOCA and WHPA are just such attempt.

supra note 202 (detailing the status of reporting requirements); Medication Abortion, supra
note 202 (detailing the status of medication abortion restrictions).
219. See Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, supra note
203 (detailing the statute of state abortion-method bans).
220. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Al. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-70 (2001)
(“Respondents in their brief cite half a dozen [relevant] examples from the [congressional]
record . . . . [E]ven if . . . each incident . . . showed unconstitutional action on the part of the
State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination . . . .”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64-65
(2000) (“Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less
any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation.”); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (“In
enacting the Patent Remedy Act, . . . Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement
by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (“The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings
mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years. . . . Rather, the emphasis of the hearings
was on laws of general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion.”).
221. See infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (discussing what overruling Roe
would mean for Congress’s Section 5 power in relation to FOCA and WHPA).
222. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 532
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As a consequence, adopting either proposed Act would exceed
Congress’s Section 5 power.
a. Freedom of Choice Act
Just as Congress enacted RFRA in response to Smith, the
most recent version of FOCA cites the Court’s decision in
Gonzales as one of the reasons why Congress should act.225
Unlike RFRA, however, FOCA does not purport to restore a
woman’s right to abortion as it existed immediately before
Gonzales. Rather, FOCA ventures back “to guarantee the
protections of Roe v. Wade.”226
Roe’s trimester framework, though, no longer is the
controlling Due Process Clause standard for abortion regulations.
227
Casey’s undue burden test governs, and when measured
against this standard as interpreted in June Medical, it is easy to
see that FOCA would not be a proportional and congruent
response to perceived infringements on the right to choose that
the Court recognized in Roe.
FOCA prohibits interference—large or small and subject to
no exception—with a woman’s ability to choose abortion before
viability.228 But even under Roe’s trimester framework, a woman
had a right to choose abortion “free of interference” only during
the first trimester.229 Before viability, but after the first trimester,
a State could regulate abortion in a manner designed to advance
maternal health.230 And Casey goes further, stating unequivocally
that a woman has the right to choose abortion pre-viability free

225. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(9) (2007) (referring to
Gonzales).
226. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(12) (2007) (emphasis added).
227. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
(1992) (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the
essential holding of Roe.”).
228. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(1)(B) (2007) (prohibiting a
State from “interfer[ing] with a woman’s right to choose . . . to terminate a pregnancy prior
to viability.”).
229. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
230. Id. at 164 (“For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State . . . may . . . regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably
related to maternal health.”).
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from “undue interference.”231 “[I]t is an overstatement,” the
Casey Court declared, “to describe [the right to choose] as a right
to decide whether to have an abortion ‘without interference from
the State.’”232 Indeed, under Casey’s undue burden standard, a
State may adopt regulations designed to advance maternal health
and protect potential life so long as the regulations do not have
the purpose or effect of creating a substantial obstacle to a
woman’s ability to choose abortion before viability.233
Laws that unquestionably are valid under the undue burden
standard as interpreted by June Medical would fail under FOCA
regardless of whether the laws are reasonably related to protecting
maternal health or potential life or have the effect of creating a
substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to choose abortion.234
FOCA would bar every aspect of the Pennsylvania statute that the
Court upheld in Casey, the physician-only requirement that the
Court sustained in Mazurek, and the partial-birth abortion ban that
the Gonzales Court decided was constitutional. It would nullify
regulations whose benefits would be sufficient to satisfy
Hellerstedt’s more rigorous, though errant balancing test.235
Indeed, FOCA is so broad that it would invalidate laws applying
throughout pregnancy that the Court specifically permitted under
Roe’s trimester framework, including the reporting and
recordkeeping regulations at issue in Danforth and the pathology
report requirement the Court upheld in Ashcroft.236
Similarly, regulations that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause permits would run afoul of FOCA’s
antidiscrimination provision, which broadly bars government
discrimination—again, large or small and subject to no
exception—against a woman’s “exercise of [her statutory right to
choose] in the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities,
231. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 875.
233. See id. at 877 (describing the undue burden standard).
234. See id. at 878 (describing the undue burden standard); see also June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2138 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining what
the undue burden standard requires).
235. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016)
(describing the undue burden standard as a balancing test)
236. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing Danforth and
Ashcroft).
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services, or information.”237 The governing standard for equal
protection purposes, though, is even more deferential than
Casey’s undue burden test. Under Geduldig v. Aiello, a measure
treating abortion differently from other medical procedures does
not discriminate based on sex, but on pregnancy, and therefore
does represent a suspect classification requiring heightened
scrutiny.238 Moreover, in Harris v. McRae, the Court stressed that
“[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures,
because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination
of a potential life.”239 And the Court in Maher v. Roe explained
that a government’s election to provide funds in connection with
childbirth, but not abortion, does not infringe on a fundamental
right because the election “places no obstacles absolute or
otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”240 Thus,
discriminating in favor of childbirth and against abortion in
allocating resources need only be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest,241 and the Court repeatedly has decided that
a government may favor childbirth over abortion in providing
facilities, services, benefits, and information.242 As a result,
FOCA’s antidiscrimination simply is not a proportional and

237. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(2) (2007).
238. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (“While it is true that only
women can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . . The program divides potential
recipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.”).
239. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
240. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
241. See id. at 478 (“[T]he less demanding test of rationality . . . applies in the absence
of a suspect classification or the impingement of a fundamental right.”).
242. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
886 (1992) (“[U]nder the undue burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive
measures which favor childbirth over abortion . . . .”); Webster v. Reproductive Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 510-11 (1989) (upholding Missouri’s decision to permit use of public employees
and facilities for childbirth, but bar use of public employees for nontherapeutic abortions);
McRae, 448 U.S. at 325 (“[I]t [is not] irrational that Congress has authorized federal
reimbursement for medically necessary services generally, but not for certain medically
necessary abortions.”); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (“[W]e find no
constitutional violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide
publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services
for nontherapeutic abortions.”); Maher, 432 U.S. at 478 (determining that Connecticut’s
decision to fund childbirth costs, but not costs associated with abortion does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
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congruent response to conduct that the Equal Protection Clause
does not permit.
Unlike FMLA, which the Court in Hibbs noted was targeted
at a very narrow aspect of the employment relationship,243 FOCA
would make “[a]ny law . . . subject to challenge at any time by
any [woman] who alleges” interference with her statutory right to
choose or discrimination in exercising that right.244 In this way,
FOCA is similar to RFRA, ADEA, and Title I of ADA, which the
Court in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett determined were too
broad for Congress’s Section 5 power.245 Like RFRA, FOCA
applies to every level of government and contains no geographic
limitation, no ending date and no means by which its
requirements terminate.246 And FOCA’s absolute prohibition
against interference with a woman’s ability to choose abortion
before viability and its sweeping antidiscrimination provision
treads on state authority even more than RFRA, which is not
absolute, but leaves standing regulations that do not substantially
burden the exercise of religion and even ones that do impose
substantial burdens, so long as the more burdensome measures
are the least restrictive means of serving a compelling interest.247
FOCA is so disconnected from the history of state abortion
regulation and from the scope of a woman’s right to choose
abortion before viability—the right to make the “ultimate
243. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003) (“Unlike the
statutes at issue in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, which applied broadly to every aspect
of state employers’ operations, the FMLA is narrowly targeted . . . and affects only one
aspect of the employment relationship.”). The Court in Lane did not determine that Title II
of ADA was likewise so limited, but the Court only considered Congress’s Section 5 power
as it applied to court access. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2003) (specifying
the limitations of the Court’s evaluation of Title II).
244. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
245. See id. at 532 (stating that RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter”); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (“[T]he accommodation duty far exceeds what is
constitutionally required . . . .”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (“The
ADEA makes unlawful, in the employment context, all ‘discriminat[ion] against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s age.’”).
246. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (discussing RFRA); Freedom of Choice
Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 3(1) (2007) (defining “government” for purposes of the Act);
see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (noting the failure of a
federal gun control law to contain geographic limitations).
247. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (describing RFRA’s requirements).
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decision”248—that “[i]t appears . . . to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.”249 Consistent with what the
Court stated with respect to RFRA, “[l]aws valid under [Casey
and June Medical] would fall under [FOCA] without regard to
whether they” place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion pre-viability. 250 As a result, FOCA cannot
be considered preventive or remedial, and Congress does not have
the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
the legislation.
b. Women’s Health Protection Act
Like FOCA, WHPA applies to every level of government,
contains no geographic or time limitation, and offers no means
for a State to be relieved of its requirements entirely.251 Arguably,
though, WHPA, is more modest and focused. Rather than broadly
barring states from interfering with a woman’s decision to have
an abortion pre-viability, WHPA invalidates only particular types
of abortion measures and even would allow some measures of
those types if they satisfy a statutory means-ends test.252 Still, the
WHPA does not have the same degree of focus that the Hibbs
Court noted with respect to FMLA, and it otherwise does not
represent a proportionate and congruent response to the alleged
harm WHPA seeks to prevent or remedy.253 This is so for a
number of reasons.
First, inconsistent with both Casey and Roe, WHPA
generally makes no distinction between regulations that apply
pre-viability and post-viability. WHPA refers to viability only in
248. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992).
249. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
250. Id. at 534.
251. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 5 (providing
that the Act preempts all inconsistent state and local regulations).
252. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)-(c)
(covering certain types of regulations and offering states a means to be relieved of the
statute’s limitations).
253. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737-38 (2003); see also
Megan K. Donovan, After the Latest Supreme Court Ruling on Abortion, the Women’s
Health Protection Act Is More Important than Ever, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/F5VH-J48W.
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relation to certain prohibitions on abortion and abortion
procedures.254 Yet, Casey and Roe both recognize that states have
substantial latitude with respect to post-viability regulations,
permitting a State to “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”255
Second, what WHPA requires in terms of exceptions from
post-viability restrictions when a woman’s health is in jeopardy
is a stark departure from Roe and Casey.256 Roe and Casey only
require post-viability exceptions when “necessary . . . for the
preservation” of a woman’s “life or health.”257 In addition, the
Casey Court determined that a medical emergency exception that
applies when “immediate abortion of [a woman’s] pregnancy [is
necessary] to avert her death or for which a delay will create
serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major
bodily function”258 does not constitute an undue burden. Under
WHPA, however, a State must permit a post-viability abortion or
allow for relief from a pre-viability regulation whenever the
physician determines in good faith that a failure to perform a postviability abortion or a failure to perform any abortion
immediately would pose a risk—any risk—to a woman’s
health.259 The upshot of this is that a physician could avoid
compliance with an abortion restriction if, for example, the
254. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. §§ 4(a)(8),
4(a)(11).
255. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879
(1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973)). While Casey’s summary indicates
that a State’s ability to regulate abortion post-viability relates to its interest in protecting
potential life, the opinion also provides that a State may regulate abortion post-viability in
furtherance of other interests. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (identifying as part of Roe’s
essential holding that a “State[] [has the] power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if
the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.”).
Moreover, if a State may prohibit post-viability abortions entirely based on its interest in
potential life, it would make little sense that a State could not use unnecessary health and
safety regulations to make it harder to obtain an abortion and thereby protect potential life in
a more limited way than an absolute bar.
256. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions
between pre- and post-viability regulations that both Roe and Casey recognized); see also
Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(9) (addressing postviability prohibitions).
257. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 165).
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(9)-(10).
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physician determines in good faith that the restriction would pose
a 0.00000001% chance that the woman will suffer from negligible
anxiety for a day or two.260
Third, although WHPA offers states some flexibility to
regulate abortion pre-viability by permitting an otherwise
statutorily prohibited regulation if a State establishes “by clear
and convincing evidence” that the regulation “significantly
advances” a woman’s health or safety and is the least restrictive
means of doing so, WHPA’s exception varies greatly from the
undue burden standard.261 Like Title I of ADA as applied to the
States, WHPA inappropriately shifts the burden of proof with
respect to challenged abortion regulations: “[WHPA] . . . makes
it the [State]’s duty to prove that [a regulation does not impose an
impermissible] burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution
does) that the complaining party” prove that it does.262 Moreover,
in upholding Title II of ADA as it applied to conduct involving
access to courts, the Lane Court observed that the statute only
demands that a State satisfy a reasonableness standard, not an
onerous one like WHPA’s “less restrictive” means
requirement.263 In contrast to Title II, WHPA’s standard
substantially mirrors the one in RFRA that the City of Boerne
Court determined Congress did not have Section 5 power to apply
to the States,264 and similar to the effect under RFRA, “[l]aws
valid under [Casey] would fall under [WHPA] without regard to
whether they” place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion previability or apply post-viability with a life
or health exception.265 For example, WHPA’s prohibition against
260. Under Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973), a physician’s discretion with
respect to a woman’s health “may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to [her] well-being . . .
.”
261. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(d).
262. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
263. See Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-32 (2004) (“Title II does not require States
to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities.
. . . It requires only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature
of the service provided . . . .”); see also Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645,
116th Cong. § 4(d)(2).
264. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997) (describing RFRA’s
test for permissible state regulation).
265. Id. at 534.
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requiring “medically unnecessary in-person visits to the provider
of abortion services”266 almost certainly would reach the twentyfour hour waiting period that the Casey Court upheld,267 and
WHPA’s exception only permits measures that “significantly
advance” health or safety, thereby failing to take into account a
State’s “profound interest in potential life”268 and a State’s ability
to regulate in pursuit of that interest even when there is no healthrelated benefit.269 In addition, WHPA’s bar against imposing
more severe penalties on abortion providers than are imposed on
other health care professionals for similar acts or omissions fails
to take into account that both Roe and Casey recognize that the
presence of a fetus makes abortion unique.270
Finally, WHPA would take away the discretion that state
legislatures have in determining how to regulate the medical
profession and hand that role to the courts, which would be a
substantive change in what the Due Process Clause requires.
Casey explains that, “[a]s with any medical procedure, the State
may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman
seeking an abortion.”271 Moreover, the June Medical Court
underscored that “[n]othing about Casey suggested that a
weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job
for the courts” and that once a showing is made that a regulation
is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, “the only question
for a court is whether [the regulation] has the ‘effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus.’”272 WHPA, in contrast, would make courts,
not state legislatures, the arbiters of whether an abortion
266. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(7).
267. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
885 (1992) (discussing Pennsylvania’s waiting period).
268. Id. at 837; see also Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong.
§ 4(a)(7).
269. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (discussing Pennsylvania’s waiting period and stating
that, “under the undue burden standard[,] a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures
which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest”).
270. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (indicating how the Roe and Casey
Courts described the abortion procedure); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)
(explaining why abortion is different from other medical procedures).
271. Id.
272. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136, 2138 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
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regulation sufficiently advances health and safety.273 Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the authority
to make a shift of this sort.
V. BEYOND JUNE MEDICAL—IMPLICATIONS IF ROE
IS OVERRULED
Although Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment will not allow it to enact far-reaching
statutes like FOCA and WHPA, given the history of judicial
decisions regarding certain abortion regulations, Congress
currently has some power to enact preventative or remedial
legislation with respect to abortion rights. If Roe is overruled,
however, its Section 5 power nearly disappears. Overruling Roe
would mean that a woman has no right under the Due Process
Clause to choose abortion,274 and as discussed above, under
Geduldig v. Aiello, abortion regulations typically will not give
rise to equal protection claims commanding heightened
scrutiny.275
Without Roe and Casey, the evidence of
unconstitutional conduct described above would evaporate
because laws previously thought to be unconstitutional in fact
were not.
Moreover, though it long has been recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars “the arbitrary deprivation of . . .
liberty, . . . ‘the Amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is,
. . . was [not] designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of
the people[.]’”276 For Fourteenth Amendment purposes, then, just

273. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(d)(1)
(providing that a State must convince a court that a “limitation or requirement significantly
advances the safety of abortion services or the health of patients”).
274. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or . . . in the Ninth
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
275. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing Geduldig).
276. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887).
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like legislation that discriminates based on age or disability,277
abortion regulation would need only be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. This, the Court emphasized in
Heller v. Doe, is an extremely deferential standard:
[A regulation] neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong
presumption of validity. . . . [A] legislature . . . need not
“actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale
supporting its [regulation].” . . . Instead, a [regulation] “must
be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the
[regulation].”278

Given the State’s interests in protecting potential life and
women’s health,279 it would be nearly impossible to establish that
an abortion ban, limitation, or regulation does not meet this
standard.280 Congress cannot enforce under Section 5 what the
Fourteenth Amendment does not protect under Section 1.

277. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (“States
are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the
disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (“States may discriminate on the basis of age without
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.”).
278. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (internal citations omitted). See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (describing rational basis review in the
due process context).
279. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73 (describing government interests supporting
abortion regulations).
280. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,154 (1973) (“[A] State may properly assert
important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (“[T]he asserted ‘right’ to
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington’s assisted-suicide
ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests.”); Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-20
(“[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines
is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose.”) (internal citations omitted); Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (“The burden is on the one attacking
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Roe endures—at least for now. Thus, Congress seems to
have some meaningful measure of power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to adopt preventive and remedial
legislation with respect to the constitutional right to choose that
Roe established and that the Casey Court declared to be within
Section 1’s Due Process Clause. Contrary to Hellerstedt, though,
June Medical explains that courts are not to engage in some
rigorous balancing of benefits and burdens when evaluating a due
process challenge to an abortion regulation.281 Casey’s undue
burden standard, the June Medical Court emphasized, leaves
states with much more freedom to regulate abortion. As a
consequence, Congress’s Section 5 power in the abortion context
is not quite as hearty as one might have thought during
Hellerstedt’s reign.
Enacting FOCA or WHPA would be “a considerable
congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens.”282 Because of June Medical, it now is quite apparent
that Congress does not have the power under Section 5 to adopt
either proposed Act. “Simply put, [WHPA and FOCA are] not
designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be
unconstitutional because of their” effect on a woman’s ability to
choose abortion.283 Proponents of FOCA and WHPA will need
to make significant changes to the bills to squeeze them into
Section 5. If they don’t want to do that, they must find
congressional power elsewhere in the Constitution.

281. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Casey Court did not adopt a balancing test).
282. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
283. Id. at 534-35

